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;,.,-

- v s ~

;

'•• ,.:r

UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND
GUARANTY COMPANY,
Defendant-Added.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

,

NATURE OF THE CASE
This action, in the sum of $2,782.00 was commenced

on October 2, 1972, by plaintiff, a corporate general contractor, to establish its right to liquidated damages against the
defendant subcontractor because of the defendant's failure to
proceed promptly, in a good, workmanlike manner, and to complete a contract for the plumbing and mechanical construction
work on two (2) State of Utah Road Maintenance Stations referred
to as road sheds, one located at Salt Lake City, Utah, and one
at Manila, Utah.

The defendant denied these allegations and

filed a cross claim and counterclaim, alleging as a first claim
that the plaintiff and its surety upon said projects owned defen-

- 2 -

«

14-1-5 U.C.A. (1953), as amended; and as a second claim, that

I

plaintiff only owed defendant the sum of $3,249*77 for several

^

other unrelated transactions.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a plenary trial, the court filed a memorandum
decision, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a joint and
several judgment against the plaintiff and its surety, on defendant's cross claim and counterclaim in the sum of $8,494.95 on
its first claim, and against plaintiff in the sum of $782.25
upon the second claim.

Motions to amend the findings of fact,

conclusions of law, and judgment were made by all parties.
The Court denied the motion of plaintiff and its surety, granted
the defendant's motion to amend, and awarded to the defendant
attorney's fees of $2,607.50 against the plaintiff and its surety
on the defendant's first claim.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff and plaintiff for and on behalf of its
surety asks for a reversal of certain findings of fact and conclusions of law, for reversal of the joint and several judgments
against plaintiff and its surety, for reversal of the award
against plaintiff and its surety of attorney's fees, or in the
alternative, for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, hereinafter referred to as Roberts,
submitted a bid to the plaintiff (Ex. 2-P) which was accepted
by the plaintiff, hereinafter referred to as Leger, to do the

1

- 3 mechanical and plumbing work as described in the plans
(Ex. 3-P) and specifications (Ex. 22-P) on maintenance
stations at 1950 South Fourth West, Salt Lake City, and at
Manila, Utah.

The bid contained the following material

provisions:
(a) In performance of this work, time is of the
essence and I agree to actually move on to the job,
with all necessary tools, supplies and equipment,
within two (2) working days after receiving written
or oral notice and to start and carry on the work
uninterruptedly to completion of the stage directed
by the general contractor.
\

(h) I agree to replace any defective workmanship or materials which occur within one (1) year
from date of completion at no cost to the general
contractor or the owner.
(j) Quality of all materials and/or work furnished must be as specified. All materials will
be subject to inspection and approval after delivery.
If materials are rejected, they will be disposed
of at no cost to the general contractor or owner.
(p) The work shall be commenced upon written
or oral order to proceed and completed within the
time stated in this bid. If the work is not completed in accordance with the foregoing, it is understood that the general contractor will suffer damage
and it being impractical and unfeasible to determine
the amount of actual damage, it is agreed that i:
will pay, on demand, to the general contractor,as
fixed and liquidated damages and not as penalty,
the sum of $50.00 for each calendar day of delay
until the work is completed and accepted. Extension
of time shall be granted, when asked for in writing,
when it is, in the judgment of the general contractor, not practical or impossible or because of
unforeseeable causes beyond control and without
fault or negligence on my behalf to complete said
work in the specified time. (Above causes including
but not restricted to strikes, war, acts of God,
acts of the Government, acts of the owner, acts of
another contractor in the performance of a contract
with the owner, and adverse weather conditions.)
I recognize the general contractor has a completion gate guarantee in his contract with the
owner that calls for completion on or before November 30, 1971.

- 4 In addition to the liquidated damages, I agree
to pay the general contractor an amount equal to
his cost in maintaining a field office and supervision over the work for each day beyond the specified completion date if it is determined that I
caused this delay, because: I recognize and agree
that the general contractor's costs are directly
proportional to the length of the construction
period, and therefore shall reimburse the general
contractor for all days beyond the specified completion date, whether an extension of time is
granted or not. (Emphasis added)
Leger's employees*commenced work on the Salt Lake Road
Shed on August 1, 1971, (Tr. 1st day, p. 9, 1.26).

Roberts'

employees were working on the same job on August 4, 1971, (Ex.
17-P under date of August 4, 1971).

Further, Roberts was

aware before August 1, 1971, that Leger intended to begin the
job and had ordered the pipe needed for the job by August 1,
1971,. (TR. 2nd day, p. 112, 1. 17-23).

The contractual obli-

gations which Roberts had to Leger were as follows, (Tr. 1st
day, p. 15):
1. Installation of underground piping for
sewer and other utilities.
2. Welding and fabrication of radiant heating
pipe gridwork, also referred to as pads, covering
the floor of the building garage area consisting
of eight (8) bays in Salt Lake City and four (4)
bays at Manila, Utah, but which did not cover the
office area in either place.
3. Installation of plumbing and fixtures in
office area.
4.

Installation of boiler and pumps.

5.

Installation of septic tanks.

6.

Installation of the water line and gas line.

The installation of the radiant heating pads was a
major portion of Roberts' contractual obligations.

The mater-

ials and installation occupied the entire interior of both

- 5 buildings except for the office portion, thereby preventing
the pouring of concrete floors over the pads and all other
inside work requiring scaffolding on the interior of the
building, (Tr. 1st day, p. 10, L. 10).
The welding and fabrication of the heating pads was
performed by Dartnell Welding, a subcontractor of Roberts,
(Tr. 2nd day, p. 126). Roberts was informed that the Salt
Lake project was ready for the heating pads to be installed
on August 27, 1971, (Tr. 1st day, p. 10, 1. 21 to p. 11, L. 12)
and the Manila project, on September 4, 1971, (Tr. 1st day,
p. 50) . .

Roberts was aware of the progress of the job, and

was required by the contract to move on the job within two (2)
days after being requested to do so.

Yet he failed to begin

on the heating pads at Salt Lake City until October 8, 1971,
and at Manila, until September 14, 1971.

When asked about this

problem by the court, Roberts replied that the header part of
the pad for Manila was being fabricated in Dartnell f s shop,
(Tr. 2nd day, p. 126), yet Roberts offered no explanation as
to why fabrication in the shop wasn't completed by Dartnell
so that work at the jobsite could proceed two (2) days after
August 27, 1971 at Salt Lake City, and two (2) days after
September 4, 1971 at Manila.

Moreover, the defendant failed

to call any witnesses from its own subcontractor, Dartnell,
who performed the welding to explain the reason for the delay.
The work of fabricating, welding, and testing the
heating pads at the Salt Lake Shed should have taken three
(3) to four (4) weeks, according to Lou Leger, president of
plaintiff, (Tr. 1st day, p. 12, L. 7 ) ,
( l\?\
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State Building Board Inspector, who appeared for the defendant, (Tr. 2nd day, p. 45. L. 17-25).

I

No other competent

fl

testimony was introduced to show how long this portion of

j

Roberts' work should have taken.

The last welding on the

Salt Lake City job was done on October 28, 1971.

It was tested

for the first time on November 11, 1971, (Tr. 2nd day, p. 115,
L. 2-16).

The heating pads on the Salt Lake City job could

not be approved until December 7, 1971 because they would
not hold 150 pounds of pressure, as required by the specifi-

I

cations, (Ex. 48-P, report sheet December 7, 1971, Ex. 22-P
Section 18B, Heating and Ventilation, paragraph 3 ) .
When Roberts was asked why no work was done after

i

October 28, 1971, Roberts said that storm had caused some
difficulty in pinning down where air was escaping from the
lines, and that was why it took so long after the 28th of
October, (Tr. 2nd day, pp. 127-128).

On the other hand,

Roberts 1 own records, (Ex. 17-P) show that the last welding

4

I

on the Salt Lake Road Shed (designated in his records as
SLRS or RS) was performed on October 27, 1971.

The same

exhibit also records that no further work of any sort was done
on SLRS until November 10, 11 and 12, 1971, and not again
until November 23, 29 and 30, and December 1, 2, and 4, 1971.
For the month of November, then, Roberts1 own records show
that out of twenty-two (22) working days, excluding Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays, his employees were on the SLRS job only
six (6) days.

The construction records of the Utah State

Building Board (Ex. 48-P) show approximately the same date
of work.
1971.

Rain is noted by these records only on November 29,

1

- 7 ~
The first pressure test in Exhibit 48-P is shown as
occurring on November 24, 1971. As of that date, the system
was leaking about one (1) pound of air pressure per hour.
Location of leaks in welds was noted on November 29, 1971.
The pad was still leaking on December 1, 1971. No work by
Roberts ' men is recorded again in Exhibit 48-P until December
6, 1971, when pressure was put on the pad.

On December 7,

1971, the pressure was noted as being about 160 pounds.
Roberts testified there was "a lot of rain," while
the weather records (Ex. 46-P) for the period of October 27th
show rain on October 27, 29, 30 (Saturday), 31 (Sunday), November 12 (from 5:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight), November 13 (Saturday), and November 14 (Sunday), November 15 (from 12:00 midnight to 7:00 a.m.), November 16 (10:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight),
November 26 (4:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.), November 27 (from 3:00
a.m. to 7:00 a.m., and from 4:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.)(Saturday).
These same records show that if Roberts had commenced work on
the heating pads within two (2) days after August 27th, he
•

•

•

'

•

•

•

-

'

•

•

'

\

• •

\

.
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.
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would have encountered virtually no precipitation nor inclement
weather during regular working time,(month of September, Ex.
46-P).

Contrary to Roberts' complaints about inclement wea-

ther, no extension of time for any reason was requested by
Roberts nor give by Leger (R. p. 36-37, Finding No. 32).
Further, the plans and specifications called for the
following items to be furnished by Roberts (Ex. 22-P), Sections
18A-05:
'

3. Lubricated plug valves equal to Nordstrom
'or Walworth....
• Workmanship....

,

f

..

- 81. Run lines as indicated on plans and connect up
to gas main or to supply tank furnished by owner.
and at Section 18B-11 of Exhibit 22~P:
Boiler Flue and Breaching....
2. Shall be constructed with a stainless steel
line and a galvanized steel casing separated from
liner by spacers.
i

There is no dispute that the defendant failed and
refused to properly accomplish the foregoing requirements of
the specifications.

Larry Roberts, president of Roberts Cor-

poration, Inc., the defendant, acknowledged that the lubricated
plug valve he installed at Manila did not have a lubrication
fitting on it, admitted that he refused to replace it, (Tr. 2nd
day, pp* 105 and 106), and refused to do anything further about
the aluminum stack on the boiler at Manila other than to write
his subcontractor a letter of demand, (Tr. 2nd day, p. 80,
L. 26). Roberts, through its president, Larry Roberts, refused
to install the gas line at the Salt Lake City job to a gas main,
although Leger and the Utah State Building Board requested that
Roberts do the work, (Tr. 1st day, pp. 18-19).
Both the furnace at Manila and the furnace at Salt
Lake City, which were also Roberts1 responsibility, never operated properly (Tr. 1st day, pp. 41 and 42).

As a result, Leger

was required to hire a boiler repairman to resolve the problem,
despite repeated requests to Roberts to provide the remedy
himself (Tr. 1st day, pp. 41 and 42).
Roberts repeatedly ignored these items even though
they were shown on the punch lists from the Utah State Building
Board (Ex. 4-P, 5-P, 6-P and 7-P). He also repeatedly refused
to correct these items (Tr. 1st day, pp. 22-25).

This

- 9 resulted in the sum of $11,330.42 being held up from the State
of Utah until February 26, 1973, some five (5) months after
the filing of the instant action by the plaintiff, (Tr. 1st
day, p. 44, L. 22,; Tr. 2nd day, p. 12, L. 6-10; Ex. 21-P).
Despite the foregoing undisputed facts, the Court
.»

failed to make any finding that Roberts1 sole remedy in accordance with his contract was to apply in writing to Leger, and
made the following findings of fact which are erroneous: (R. 37-40)
34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49. Furthermore,
after finding that Roberts was not entitled to attorney's fees,
the trial court granted a motion to amend the findings and
judgment to award attorney's fees, which Leger and its surety
also claim is error.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO FAIL TO
FIND THAT DEFENDANT'S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME IN THE EVENT OF DELAY WAS
TO MAKE WRITTEN APPLICATION TO THE PLAINTIFF.
The accepted bid of the defendant (Ex. 2-P) contained
the following language: (Emphasis added)

-.

I will pay, on demand, to the general contractor, as fixed and liquated damages and not as penalty,
the sum of $50.00 for each calendar day of delay until
the work is completed and accepted. Extension of time
shall be granted, when asked for in writing, when it
is, in the judgment of the general contractor, not
practical or impossible or because of unforeseeable
causes beyond control and without fault or negligence
on my behalf to complete said work in the specified time.
There is no question that Roberts never asked for

any extension of time in writing; nor did Leger give Roberts
any extension of time in which to complete and obtain accept-

- 10 A clause similar to the above is seen in Russell vs.
Bothwell & Swaner Co., 57 Utah 362, 194 P. 1109 (1920), wherein
the plaintiff entered into a contract with a contractor, one of
the co-defendants, to furnish carpentry work for the erection
of a dwelling for another co-defendant,

A mechanic's lien was

filed by the plaintiff and suit was filed for a sum claimed due
plaintiff.
... •:'-. The contract between the plaintiff and the general
contractor, who was referred to as "owner11, provided in part
as follows: -'•'
Should the contractor be delayed in the completion or presecution of the work by the act, neglect, or
" ' default of the owner or by any damage caused by fire or
other casualty for which the contractor is not responsible,
or by general strike or lockout caused by act of employes
and beyond the control of the contractor, then the time
herein specified for the completion of the work may be
extended for a period equivalent to the time lost by reason of any or all the causes aforesaid, provided a claim
for such allowance is determined by agreement in writing
of the parties hereto.
The plaintiff subcontractor never applied for an exten
sion of time in writing.

However, the trial court made findings

of fact that the contractor defendant delayed the plaintiff f s
carpentry work by failing and refusing to furnish materials, and
awarded the plaintiff damages for this loss of time.

The Utah

Supreme Court, after noting that there was no evidence that the
delay was the result of fraudulent, malicious, capricious, or
unreasonable acts on the part of the contractor, cited the case
of Goss vs. Northern Pacific Hospital Assn., 50 Wash. 238, 96
P. 1079, which case said:
but where the probability of the happening
of the condition has been foreseen, and a remedy is provided for its happening, the presumption is that the
garties intended the prescribed remedy as the sole^remedy

- 11 where there is nothing in the contract itself or in
the conditions surrounding its execution that necessitates a different conclusion.
Accordingly, the award for damages for delay made to
the plaintiff by the trial court was reversed.

See also

Western Engineers Inc. vs. State, 20 Utah 2d 294, 437 P.2d 216
(1968) .
The reasons given by Roberts for its delay in the
instant case were adverse weather conditions and defective
valves, which are discussed infra.

No extension of time was

requested by Roberts orally or in writing for delay from any
cause, nor was excuse an issue until the case was tried.

This

being the defendant's sole remedy in the event of delay, the
court should not have accepted Roberts ! reasons for delay as
excusing its requirements under the contract.

A finding of

fact should have been made by the court that this remedy was
the sole and exclusive remedy of Roberts if it claimed that
its delay was excused.
POINT II.
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN MAKING FINDINGS
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS MAKING A CLAIM FOR
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES ONLY FOR THE DELAY ROBERTS
WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR IN LAYING THE RADIANT
HEATING PADS IN THE MANILA AND SALT LAKE ROAD
SHEDS.
Finding of fact No. 34 provides:
Lou Leger, president of the plaintiff corporation, testified that it was claiming liquidated damages
only for the delay Roberts was responsible for in laying
the radiant heating pads in the Manila and Salt Lake
Road Sheds, it being plaintiff, Leger Construstion Company's contention that defendant was slow in starting,
laying and finding leaks in said radiant heating pads,
thus delaying pouring of cement floors.
Finding of- fact No. 42 provides as follows:

12 alleged delay in starting and completing installation
of radiant heating pads.

j

Leger's testimony regarding these findings is found in
the first day of the Transcript starting at page 67, line 25:

t
i

Q Now, he (Roberts) had some work to do in the
office area, didnft he, so far as toilet facilities go?
A

Yes.

>

-• .- '

Q And that can't be done until after the framing
is up, can it?
A

No.

Q

And the framing is your responsibility?

A

Yes,

Q He couldn't finish that office portion until
the sheetrock was up, could he?
t

.

A -No.
Q

Do you know when the sheetrock went on?

A

I don't have that record here.

Q

It had to go on after the framing, doesn't it?

A

Yes.

4

. ;. "

THE COURT: Is it your claim the delay is based
solely upon the heating pad?
THE WITNESS:

Yes, sir,

^ :

(Emphasis added)
The question interposed by the court did not ask Leger
if the claim of the corporation for liquidated damages is based
solely upon the delay with respect to the heating pads.

Leger

was being asked questions at that time which related to possible
delay by either Leger or Roberts in the office area of the building.

The office area of the building did not have the heating

pads in the floor-

At that time the trial court interposed only

one question at line 10, page 68, of the Transcript, in which

1

-

±J

-

the court referred to the delay on the heating pads only.

It

is obvious, in the context that the question was asked, that
Leger's answer intended to convey to the court that the delay
in construction about which he was being questioned at that
time was not due to any failure of Roberts to install toilet
fixtures in the office area, as he was being queried about in
the immediately preceding questions, but was solely due to
installation

of

the heating pad.

;;

In the first day of the Transcript at page 82, line
24, the same basic sequence of questions is seen relative to
the Manila job:
Q

They (Leger's men) poured the slabs in

A

Yes.

Q

What about the framing, when did that go

A

I don't know.

October?

in?

Q The framing had to go in before Roberts
could put their pipes in the walls, right?
A

Yes.

Q

And the sheetrock went on after that?

A

Yes.

Q You have to have an inspection before the
dry-wall goes on, don't you?
A

No.

Q Tell me if I am saying this correctly,
The total to be alleged attributed to Roberts at the
Manila job resulted only from the laying of the pad;
is that right?
A

Yes.

(Emphasis added)
The last question is incapable of any definition/
There is no subject of the sentence.

Counsel simplv said.

- 14 "The total to be alleged to be attributed,. ..."

Nothing more was

said by counsel as to what he meant by the use of the wor.d "total.
Any answer to such a question is meaningless, as the question
itself does not specify what is being asked.

No other questions

were asked to clarify what was meant, and none of the questions
preceding that question use any word to fill in the meaning as'
to what was meant by "total."

In any event, the question was

pertinent only to the Manila Job. /
In both of these underlined questions and answers,
no mention is made of the plaintiff corporation's claim for
liquidated damages, nor is Leger asked if that was the extent
of the entire claim of the corporate plaintiff.

Further, there

is no mention made in these questions of Roberts' refusal to
install the gas line, (Tr. 1st day, pp. 18 and 1 9 ) , nor a stainless steel stack at Salt Lake (Tr. 1st day, p. 20), and the items
on the punch lists (Ex. 4-P, 5-P, 6-P, 7~P), nor in particular,
the lubricated plug valve at Manila, which resulted in the State
of Utah's refusing to pay Leger until Leger finished Roberts 1
work.

To base a finding that the plaintiff corporation was

limiting its entire claim upon both road sheds solely upon Leger's
answer to the above two questions as to delay on the heating pads
as opposed to delay in installing the office toilet fixture, is
to allow both the court and counsel to take advantage of tricking
a witness into saying something he obviously did not mean, and,
as a matter of fact, did not say, in the context of the record.
A finding of the trial court must be based on competent evidence that supports the findings.
120 Utah 50, 232 P. 2d 362 (1951).
^ f ^ A ^ n n ^ fn
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Johnson vs. Hughes,

No competent evidence was

fhpf T.^cr^-r• <=• norDoration intended to limit

- 15 its claim for liquidated damages to delay caused by Roberts in
the fabrication, welding and testing of the heating pads; thus,
this finding of the trial court must be reversed.
POINT III.
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO MAKE ITS
FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT COMMENCED WORK
ON THE RADIANT HEATING PADS AT SALT LAKE
CITY WITHOUT ALSO MAKING A FINDING AS TO
THE DATE ROBERTS WAS REQUESTED TO DO SUCH
WORK.
.

-.

'

• Finding No. 36 states that Roberts1 installation of
the radiant heating pads at the Salt Lake Road Shed was commenced on October 8, 1971; yet it is silent as to when Roberts
was requested to do the work.

The record shows without dispute

that Roberts was told by Leger to commence this work on August
27, 1971. Roberts offered no reason for the delay until
October 8th, a period of 42 days, until he was asked about it
by the court.

At that time, his sole excuse for such a delay

was that he was still fabricating the panels in the shop.
However, no reason or excuse was offered by Roberts as to why
the fabrication in the shop was not commenced prior to August
27th so that the materials for installation would be available
for on-site installation when the site was ready for these
pads, nor why the work could not have been carried out uninterruptedly in accordance with Paragraph a. of defendant's
contract if he had commenced the fabrication on time. The
failure of the court to award damages in accordance with this
admitted delay, a period of 43 days, or one third of the work
period of a contract which was commenced on August 1st and was
to be completed by November 30th, a total of 122 days, was
error because the facts showing this part of the delay by

16 POINT IV.
THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN GIVING ANY
WEIGHT TO TIME CONSUMED IN CONSTRUCTING
A ROAD SHED IN LEHI BECAUSE SUCH EVIDENCE
WAS INCOMPETENT TO SHOW WHAT A REASONABLE
TIME IN CONSTRUCTING THE HEATING PADS IN
SALT LAKE AND MANILA, UTAH WOULD BE.

€
I
I

Finding No. 39 states that no greater progress was made
on a road shed construction by Leger at Lehi than at the Manila
and Salt Lake Road Sheds.

This was based upon testimony on cross

examination by Leger that the Lehi installation of radiant heating
pads took about the same amount of time as the Manila and Salt
Lake City jobs.

This particular finding is irrelevant and incom-

I

petent to show that Roberts did not delay the Salt Lake and
Manila jobs because there was no showing that the mechanical

I

contractor on the Lehi job did that project in a workmanlike

^j

manner.

All that it shows is that another subcontractor may

have breached its contract with Leger, and is irrelevant and

I

immaterial to the case involving Roberts and Leger.
POINT V.
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO FIND THAT
INCLEMENT WEATHER IN ANY WAY MADE WELDING
ON THE SALT LAKE ROAD SHED DIFFICULT. .
The hourly precipitation section of the weather reports
for September 1971 (Ex. 46-P) shows that during the month of

|
.
'
I

September, 1971, when the defendant should have been working on
the heating pads for the Salt Lake Road Shed, but was not, pre-

* |

cipitation fell during working hours only five days out of the

.

total of thirty (30) days with only one (1) day showing more than

'

one-hundredths (1/100) of an inch of precipitation.

^

On the other

hand, during October, 1971, when the defendant actually started
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work on the heating pads, Exhibit 47-P shows precipitation
during working hours for eight (8) days, and out of these
eight (8) days, the 16th, 17th, 24th, and 31st were weekends during which time Roberts had no men on any job.
finding of fact No. 31 (R. 39) is in error.

Thus,

The only testimony

to support this finding was the testimony of Thomas Patterson,
and he admitted that he didn't know how often or how much rain
fell during this period-of time (Tr. 2nd day, p. 44). Therefore, Patterson's testimony was not competent to establish
that the weather hampered Roberts.

On the other hand, the

weather reports show clearly that Roberts encountered precipitation during working hours for only four (4) days out of
twenty-one (21) working days during the entire thirty-one (31)
days of October, 1971.
POINT VI.
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO FIND THAT
DEFENDANT WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR DELAY ;
CAUSED BY FAULTY VALVES FURNISHED BY IT.
Finding No. 46 (R. 13) is as follows:
The main problem in completing the radiant
heating pad on the Salt Lake Road Shed was leaks which
were ultimately found to be in several control valves
furnished by a supplier to Roberts and which were as
specified in the plans and specifications.
Section 18B of Exhibit 22-P provides the specifications for
the heating and ventilating system and Subdivision 18B-06 of
this exhibit governs the specifications as to valves and provides:
Valves, strainers and items listed below
are specified with Crane....numbers. Walworth, Nibco,
R. P. & C. will be acceptable.

- 18 Thereafter, the valves required are listed by their
various Crane numbers.

Nowhere in the specifications is the

brand name, "Jenkins,11 mentioned or specified.

Roberts testi-

fied that the valves he installed which leaked were Jenkins
ball valves of a 125-pound rating, (Tr. 2nd day, p. 75) an
obvious deviation from the specifications, as Exhibit 22 pro- *
vides at Section 18B, Paragraph 3, first sentence , that the
system shall prove tight under pressure of 150 p.s.i.g.
Under Section 18 of Exhibit 22-P, it is provided as
follows:

.. •
G.

Materials:

3'. If a contractor receives approval to use
other than first named items, he shall be held responsible to meet specified capacities, and must check space
and openings available to be certain any alternate equipment will fit the job site and conditions. In the event
other than first named equipment is used and it will
not fit the job site conditions, this contractor assumes
responsibility for replacement with items first named
in the specifications. (Emphasis added)
It is apparent that the reason for leakage of the
valves was that they were not as required by the specifications
therefore a breach of the contract Roberts signed with Leger.
Even if the valves provided by Roberts were in accordance with the specifications, but were defective, there is
nothing in the contract of the defendant, (Ex. 1) or the specifications, (Ex. 22-P) which makes such a fact an excuse for
delay of performance.

The furnishing of defective material

under a contract to furnish that material is not found in any
treatise or cases as an excuse for delay in performance.
Section 13, Am. Jur. 2d 58; Section 54, 17 Am. Jur 2d, Section
387, 388; also, 17 Am. Jur. 2d 400 et seq.

- 19 POINT VII.
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO, IN EFFECT,
REQUIRE LEGER TO PROVE, BY A PREPONDERANCE
OF THE EVIDENCE, FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE ON THE
PART OF THE DEFENDANT.
Finding No. 44 provides:
Leger did not establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that the failure to complete the work
within the time specified at the Salt Lake Road Shed
on the radiant heating pad was due to the fault or
negligence of the defendant.
Such a finding has the effect of converting a breach
of contract action for failure to perform, to a claim by Leger
against Roberts for negligence which was neither pleaded nor
intended to be proved.

It is hornbook law that it is not

necessary to prove negligence or fault in a contract action.
II Williston on Contracts, 3rd Ed. 2, Section 1290:
As a contract consists of a binding promise
or set of promises, a breach of contract is a failure,
without legal excuse, to perform any promise which forms
the whole or any part of a contract.
It is apparent that the trial court completely misconstrued one provision of Exhibit 2-P:
(p)....Extension of time shall be granted,
when asked for in writing, when it is, in the judgment of the general contractor, not practical or
impossible or because of unforseeable causes beyond
control and without fault or negligence on my behalf
to complete said work in the specified time.
(Emphasis added)
The clause referring to fault or negligence is used
only in conjunction with the judgment of the contractor in
response to a written request by Roberts for an extension of
time, which request was never made by Roberts. However/

•

Leger, the contractor, was never given the opportunity to use
his judgment as to whether Roberts1 delay was because of the

- 20 various causes listed and without fault or negligence on the part

f

of Roberts., Since neither party invoked the clause, it has no
efficacy.
would

Even if the clause were to have any effect, Roberts

I

be the party having the burden of proving the affirmative

defense of excuse by a preponderance of the evidence.
. . . .

,

.

•

.

'

•

.

.

•

•

. . - .
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I
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POINT VIII.
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO FIND THAT THE
WALLS AND ROOFS OF THE SALT LAKE ROAD SHED
HAD NOT BEEN COiMMENCED BY LEGER NOVEMBER
22, 1971.
Finding No. 45 (R. 39) provides as. follows:
A third draw request dated November 22, 1971, on
the Salt Lake Road Shed (Ex. 12-D) prepared by Leger reported that 70% of the mechanical work required to be
done by Roberts had been completed by that date. Work
which was required to be done by Leger and which was not
dependant upon the completion of the radiant heating pads,
viz., the walls and roof, had not been completed by the
thirtieth day of the month.

M^
^|

Exhibit 12-D was a request for money made by Leger to

-

the state of Utah.

I
'
I
I

No testimony was offered to show that the

figures were meant to show precise project progress.

It was

I

merely used as estimates by Leger to obtain periodic draws of
money from the state of Utah on the project.

Yet Leger testi-

|

fied that the plaintiff went ahead and started the structural

.

steel and roofing, and this is supported by the records of the
resident inspector for the state of Utah (Ex. 48-P) which shows

I

work on the walls and roof on the following dates with the following work performed:
Roof trusses placed or roof work done: October
14, 15, 18, 19, 20, and 12.
Exterior wall block masonry: October 20, 21,
22, 25, 26, 27, November 8, 9.
Welding roof steel: November 12.
'•.".•
Roof sheeting: November 15.
Facia framing:XT November
16.
T~~_
1 -7

I

%

- 21 POINT IX.
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO FIND THAT
LEGER DID NOT PROVE THE NUMBER OF CALENDAR
DAYS OF DELAY, IF ANY, CAUSED BY ROBERTS
ON THE SALT LAKE ROAD SHED.
Leger proved without dispute that Roberts was requested
to begin on-site fabrication of the radiant heating pads on
August 27, 1971, and Roberts admittedly did not start until
October 8, 1971. Deducting two (2) days pursuant to the contract, a total of forty (40) days are left attributable to
this portion of the delay.

Allowing the defendant a full month

to complete the fabrication testing and completion

of the work

would bring the completion to November 8, 1971. As has been
stated before on this very point, the defendants own expert
testified that it would take 2% to 3 weeks to complete the
job, and the defendant did not proffer any evidence to the
contrary.

The pads at the Salt Lake Road Shed, however, were

not completed until December 6, 1971, a period of twenty-nine
(29) days.

This makes a total delay of sixty-nine (69) calendar

days out of a contract that should have been completed in four
(4) months.
The record (Ex. 48-P) shows that there was a final
inspection at Salt Lake City on May 3, 1972, and other punch
list items completed on May 17, 1972. A punch list was sent
by the State of Utah Building Board on May 4, 1972, and a copy
of the same was sent to Roberts at about the same time (Ex.
4-P, Tr. 1st day, p. 22). No work was done by Roberts in the
intervening time (Ex. 48-P and 18-P), and another punch list
was issued on June 2, 1972, which was mailed to Roberts.

This

-

2 2

-

!

punch list consisted solely of items to be completed by Roberts.

A

However, despite repeated requests, Roberts refused to correct
the operation of the boiler, requiring Leger to arrange for its
adjustment on December 13, 1972 and February 15, 1973.

The state

of Utah would not sign the Certificate of Substantial Completion
until February 22, 1973 (Tr. 2nd day, p. 9 L. 10 to p. 12, L. 10)
(Ex. 15-P and 16-P), and held Leger's last payment of $11,330.42

I

until February 26, 1973.
The Manila job was substantially complete on October
9, 1972, and because of the failure of the defendant to complete
his contract, the state held the final payment of $11,330.42
on the contract until February 26, 1973, a period of 135 calendar
days.

Adding this figure to the number of days that Roberts

undisputedly delayed on the installation of the heating pads
in Salt Lake, a period of 69 days, it is clear that Roberts
caused a total of 204 days delay in the completion of the contract, which at $50.00 per day amounts to $10,200.00, which
should have been deducted from Roberts1 contract.

It is apparent

on the record that Roberts caused other delay, such as the gas
line by deliberately refusing to perform; however, proof of the
causal relationship is difficult.

But there is no dispute, and

it is clear, that the foregoing days of delay were caused by
Roberts, and the liquidated damage clause should be enforced.
See Pearce vs. Shurtz, 2 Utah 2nd 124, 270 P. 2nd 442 (1954).

I

4

- 23 POINT X.
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S
FEES TO ROBERTS AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND ITS
SURETY.
Section 14-1-8 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, provides as
follows:
Attorney's fees allowed.—In any action brought
upon either of the bonds provided herein, or against the
public body failing to obtain the delivery of the payment
bond, the prevailing party, upon each separate cause of
action, shall recover a reasonable attorney's fee to be
taxed as costs. (Emphasis added)
The court in this case awarded the defendant attorney's
fees pursuant to the above statute, not as costs, but as a
part of the judgment.

Rule 54(d)(2) makes provisions as to

how costs are to be assessed and requires a sworn memorandum
of costs to be filed.

The above statute clearly provides that

the attorney's fees be taxed as costs. The provisions of Rule
54 must be satisfied, or the party requesting such costs will
not be awarded his costs. Walker Bank and Trust Co. vs. New
York Terminal Warehouse, 10 Utah 2nd 210, 350 P. 2nd 626, 630.
No mention of attorney's fees is made in the memorandum of costs
filed by Roberts (R. 42-43); therefore, the award for attorney's
fees should be stricken from the judgment.
Furthermore, no finding was made by the court that
Roberts was a "prevailing party," as set forth in Section 14-1-8
U.C.A.-. (1953) as amended.

There are no Utah cases which decide

the meaning of the word "prevailing" except as it may relate to
the award of costs pursuant to Rule 54 U.R.C.P.

It is common

knowledge that the award of attorney's fees always will be an
amount substantially larger than costs and, as in the instant

- 24 case, is a substantial part of the recovery over which parties
litigate.

The Utah Supreme Court has held previously that it was

I

€,

not a breach of discretion for a trial court to refuse to award

i
'

attorney's fees against an owner of a residence pursuant to

I
I

Section 38-1-18 U. C. A. (1953) as amended, which provides for
award of attorney's fees to the "successful party," even though
the court awarded the contractor seeking those attorney's fees
a judgment of some $43,000.00.

Shupe vs. Menlove 18 Utah 2nd 130,

417 P. 2nd 246 (1966).
There have been several decided cases in the state
of Alaska, which construe the words "prevailing party" for the
purpose of awarding attorney's fees.

A leading case in that juris-

diction is Malvo vs. J. C. Penney Co., Alaska 512, P. 2nd 575
(1973), where the plaintiff sued the defendant for libel and slander.

A jury found for the defendant no cause of action, and the

trial court awarded attorney's fees of $10,504.20.

The Alaska

Supreme Court, after reviewing its adopted rule that the trial
judge has wide discretion and that the Appellate Court would only
interfere.with such an award where the award was so manifestly
unreasonable that an abuse of the trial court's discretion was
established, reversed the decision as to attorney's fees.

The

court recognized that a cost requirement of a statute, valid on
its face, could offend due process because it operates to foreclose a particular party's right to be heard,

Boddie vs. Connec-

ticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380, 91 S.Ct. 780, 787, 28 L. Ed. 2nd 113,
120 (1971), then cited the following passage of Benjamin Cardozo
as follows:

- 25 I am not prepared yet to advocate costs that
would compensate for the expenses of a lawsuit. I have
seen enough of the judicial process to know its imperfections. I would not lay too heavy a burden upon the
unsuccessful litigant. Some of the losses that are incidental to the establishment of rights and the redress of
wrongs through the processes of courts should be allowed,
as a matter of social engineering, to lie where they
fall. Very likely, heavier burdens should be imposed
where there is evidence of bad faith or mere dogged
perversity. (Emphasis added) Benjamin N. Cardozo,
George S. Hellman, McGraw Hill Pub. Co. (1940)
The holding of the case was that where a party in
good faith brings a lawsuit to court for a determination of
rights and is not guilty of any reprehensible conduct, it is
an abuse of judicial discretion to penalize such a party by
awarding the full amount of the prevailing party's attorney!s
fees.

(

•'.

.'•'. .-

,In the instant case, Roberts claimed the sum of
$14,172.04 in its counterclaim and cross claim, but recovered
only the sum of $8,494.95 upon a contract where Roberts and its
creditors previously had been paid an additional sum of $58,748.87
r for its work.

It is clear from the issues raised by the record

and in this brief that there were several bona fide disputes
between the parties that reguired the determination of a court
to resolve.

The decision of the trial court in assessing the

full amount of defendant's attorney's fees against Leger and its
surety is manifestly unjust because it reguires that Leger pay
Roberts1 expenses in fighting a lawsuit that would not have
occurred had Roberts fully performed and completed his contractual duties.

To even imply that Roberts should be regarded as

a "prevailing party'1 where the violations of contractual obligations are as numerous and intentional as shown in the record

- 26 here is a miscarriage of justice, and should not be allowed to
stand as the law of this jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that
the findings of the trial court that Roberts was excused from
performance of its contract because of adverse weather conditions
and faulty valves; that Roberts did not cause Leger delaiy in the
completion of the contract; that Leger did not prove fault or
negligence on the part of Roberts, should be vacated and findings of fact entered that Roberts breached its contract with
Leger and delayed Leger's completion of the contract a total of
sixty-nine (69) days without any application for extension of
time; that Leger is entitled to liquidated damages, pursuant to
its contract, of $50.00 a day, or the sum of $10,200.00, and
that sum deducted from the amount awarded Roberts on its cross
claim would leave a net sum of $1705.05 to be awarded to Leger
on its complaint.

Further, the conclusions of law, judgment and

amended judgment should be modified accordingly.

The order

granting an amendment of the judgment to the defendant Roberts
should be reversed, and attorney's fees stricken from the amended
judgment.

.•':,.;: • • Respectfully submitted,
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